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Abstract 
This paper explores the role of mass media in people’s perceptions of 
charismatic leaders, focusing on the case of Junichiro Koizumi, Prime 
Minister of Japan from 2001 to 2006. Using survey data collected 
immediately after Koizumi’s 2005 landslide electoral victory, this study 
empirically assesses the influence of television (TV) and newspapers on 
individuals’ support for Koizumi and for the most distinctive policy action 
he announced during his campaign—the privatization of the postal service. 
The major findings are: (1) the frequency of exposure to mass media is 
positively related to the support for Koizumi but not for his principal policy 
and (2) a significant impact of TV is only observed among women. The 
habit of reading newspapers only slightly correlates with men’s support for 
Koizumi. Our study’s results suggest that compared to a political platform, 
charisma and attractiveness wield a greater influence on TV watchers of the 
opposite sex.  
Television apparently works as a powerful amplifier of leaders’ appealing 
attributes. The resulting superstar effect may allow a charismatic candidate 
to win an election, even though his main agenda item (i.e., postal 
privatization) is strongly opposed by special interest groups and members of 
the ruling party. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Popularity is one of the key determinants of the increase in market demand. For example, in the 
entertainment or sports market, the demand for superstars is far greater than that for less popular 
people, resulting in a substantial gap of earnings between superstars and others. The theory of 
superstars suggests that the celebrity effect stems from imperfect substitutability and the ability to 
attract an audience and stimulate huge amounts of consumption in large markets (Rosen 1981). 
Mass media such as television (TV) and newspapers have the power to increase the market size and 
generate a large volume of transactions that may specifically benefit superstars. Superstar effects on 
earnings have been found in several sectors of the labor market, from sports (Lucifora and Simmon 
2003) to gastronomy (Ehrmann et al. 2009).  
We extend the analysis to politics, arguing that mass media play a key role in creating superstar 
effects that may easily determine electoral outcomes. Contemporary elections are built on a visual 
foundation (Grabe and Bucy 2009). Candidates must appear telegenic enough to attract closer 
scrutiny by their audience. Electoral campaigns are devoted to strengthening candidates’ personal 
appeal, often to a larger extent than proposals for policy initiatives and programs. The rise of TV as 
a political force has created incentives for political leaders to construct their image through 
deliberate strategies designed to promote intimacy with voters and to highlight engaging personal 
attributes.4 Since in the market of politics, the superstar effect entails enduring electoral support, it 
is important to explore how exposure to mass media influences voters’ support for political actors 
and their economic agenda.  
The previous literature analyzed the relationship between exposure to media and specific political 
outcomes. Based on US historical data, Strömberg (2004) found that larger relief funds were 
allocated to counties where higher shares of households listened to the radio. Gerber and colleagues 
(2009) used a field experiment conducted in Washington to analyze the effect of newspapers’ slant 
on readers’ political knowledge, stated opinions, and voter turnout. The authors found that reading a 
liberal newspaper significantly increased support for the Democratic candidate for governor. 
Another study reported that the introduction of the conservative Fox News Channel in 20% of US 
towns led its viewers to vote for conservative Republican candidates (Della Vigna and Kaplan 
2007). Spanish-language news programs on TV also contributed to a substantial boost in voter 
turnout (Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel 2009). Researchers have increasingly investigated the mass 
media and their political influence in other countries such as Italy (Durante and Knight 2012; 
Sabatini 2012), Russia (White et al. 2005; Enikolopov et al. 2011), Mexico (Lawson and McCann 
2005), India (Olken 2009),5 and Muslim countries (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2004). These studies 
have revealed mass media’s critical role in establishing trends in public opinion. 
Since the end of the 1980s, mass media, especially TV, has wielded a crucial influence on politics 
in Japan. According to Krauss and Nyblade (2005), this situation has led the Japanese public to 
“consume” politics. This trend was considerably accelerated by the rise of Junichiro Koizumi, 
Prime Minister (PM) from 2001 to 2006. Koizumi has been regarded as the most charismatic 
political leader in Japan over the last 25 years. He is generally considered likeable and attractive; 
the New York Times described Koizumi as Japan’s best-known Elvis impersonator (Stolberg and 
Dewan 2006). Koizumi also shares similarities with Ronald Reagan in that they both communicated 
with voters using a performance-based style, and they advanced intense programs of neoliberal 
reforms aimed to reduce the size of government, deregulate industries, and increase market 
                                                   
4It was found that better-looking people earn more than average-looking people (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994; Biddle 
and Hamermesh 1998). To take the example of sports, attractiveness, as measured by facial symmetry, leads to greater 
rewards even after controlling for player performance (Berri et al. 2011). 
5Research related to media and economic issues has also been conducted based on cross-country data (Djankov 2003; 
Connolly and Hargreaves Heap 2007; Petrova 2008). 
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competition. Koizumi cleverly exploited his style, attractive appearance, and TV performances to 
attract media attention and gain the support of the majority of voters, despite the fierce opposition to 
his reforms in Japanese society and in the national political debate (Imai 2003; Ohtake 2003).  
We use individual-level data drawn from the “Social and Political Consciousness Survey in 21st 
Century Japan” (GLOPE) conducted in 2005 to assess the determinants of public consensus in 
support of Koizumi’s administration, with a focus on the role of mass media. More specifically, we 
examine how the frequency of watching TV and reading newspapers influenced public support for 
Koizumi and his principal policy. The GLOPE survey was conducted in Japan immediately after the 
2005 election to determine citizens’ perceptions about politics during an election period. In his 
electoral campaign, Koizumi deliberately and strongly drew the electorate’s attention to his program 
of postal service privatization, and he won by a landslide.6  
This paper makes several contributions to the relevant literature. First, this study empirically 
assesses whether the superstar effect may also hold true in the political market. It disentangles the 
possibly competing roles of different mass media in popularizing a charismatic leader’s image and 
attracting political consensus. The GLOPE data also allow us to illustrate how citizens’ votes for 
Koizumi were virtually disconnected from their support for the candidate’s program of public sector 
reforms. Arguably, the case of a celebrity in the Japanese political arena is useful in analyzing how 
the superstar effect can secure electoral victory, despite the opposition of special interest groups.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the political background and 
overview of Koizumi’s policies and strategies of communication. Subsection 2.3 presents two 
testable hypotheses about citizens’ views on Koizumi’s administration and platform. Section 3 
describes the dataset and provides a simple econometric framework to examine the hypotheses. 
Estimation results are reported in section 4. The final section offers concluding remarks.   
 
2. The Setting and Hypotheses 
 
2.1. Political Background  
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been Japan’s dominant party for more than 50 years 
after it was founded in 1955 (apart from two short periods in 1993–1994 and 2009–2012). It is a 
major conservative party, whose economic policies have historically been shaped around the goals 
of free trade, market competition, and export-based economic growth.7 Junichiro Koizumi is known 
as the LDP’s most popular PM. At the helm from 2001 to 2006, he was the fifth longest-serving PM 
in Japanese history. Table 1 shows that in the 1989–2012 period, Koizumi’s government lasted for 
60 months, which was longer than any other recent administration (the second longest one was 
Hashimoto’s 30-month administration, half the length of Koizumi’s). In 2005, Koizumi led the LDP 
to win one of the largest parliamentary majorities in modern Japanese history. According to opinion 
polls, public support for Koizumi peaked at 85%, the highest rating since 1989. The lowest support 
rate during the Koizumi administration was 39%, with only those of the Hosokawa and Hata 
governments being higher. Considering that the Hosokawa and Hata governments only lasted 8 and 
2 months, respectively, the lowest rating received by Koizumi was in fact quite high, compared with 
that of any other administration.8 To understand the reason why Koizumi garnered such high levels 
of support, it is necessary to discuss briefly the political and economic background of Japan’s post-
World War II period.  
The LDP is not a cohesive organization but a conglomeration of competitive factions (habatsu), 
which engage in bitter infighting. Habatsu play a fundamental role in every area of LDP political 
                                                   
6No significant relationship was observed between the results of the 2005 election in Japan and happiness (Tsutsui et al. 
2010). 
7
The LDP must not be confused with the now-defunct Liberal Party, which merged with the Democratic Party of Japan, 
the main opposition party, in November 2003. 
8The Hosokawa and Hata regimes were the first non-LDP regimes after World War II. They only received support for a 
brief period in 1993–1994.  
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activity, including candidates’ nominations, the acquisition of funds, and the allocation of party and 
government posts (Köllner 2006). According to Köllner (2006), “The LDP’s institutionalized 
factional system served as an effective functional equivalent of formalized procedures and norms of 
party management … Informal rules on how party and cabinet posts were to be allocated made the 
political careers of LDP Diet members more foreseeable and helped to reduce uncertainty” (p. 248). 
For a long time during the LDP’s ruling period, various factions formed links with special interest 
groups and industries, which are considered to play key roles in maintaining the LDP’s electoral 
dominance. In fact, in Japan, politicians have been suspected of increasing the expenditure allocated 
to public infrastructures, with the aim of attracting the support of the construction industry 
(Yamamura and Kondoh 2013). This case may explain why “larger amounts are spent on public 
works than in other countries, controlling for size and population” (Doi and Ihori 2009, p. 181). The 
LDP members of the Diet also form committees called “policy tribes” (zoku-giin), which serve to 
favor those interest groups that provided support in electoral campaigns.9 In turn, thanks to the 
strong electoral support from these groups, the LDP maintained a one-party cabinet for 38 years 
during the 1955–1993 period.10  
In the early 1990s, the LDP’s political power and internal stability declined as a consequence of 
corruption scandals. Some influential LDP members left the organization and founded new parties 
that entered into coalitions with existing ones. Eventually, in August 1993, a seven-party coalition 
opposed to the LDP formed a new government that stayed in charge for 10 months. As a response, 
the LDP formed a new alliance with the Social Democratic Party. Since that time, the LDP has 
always been forced to share its governmental responsibilities with other parties to ensure a 
parliamentary majority. From the first half of the 1990s, Japan experienced long-term economic 
stagnation, which further undermined the LDP’s predominance. The political influence of specific 
interest groups (which mostly included representatives of rural areas) declined, and the mobilization 
of unaffiliated and undecided voters (mainly living in urban areas) became increasingly important. 
At the beginning of the new millennium, the LDP thus faced a turning point. 
 
2.2. Koizumi’s Victory in the 2005 Election  
In 2001, Koizumi was elected president of the governing LDP. He cleverly exploited his 
flamboyant and colorful political style to gain the vote of prefectural party organizations, whose 
rank-and-file members were longing for a plain-spoken leader with charisma and a vision for a new 
Japan. Koizumi pledged to scrap political conventions, appointing cabinet members based on 
expertise and merit rather than on their membership in habatsu (Strom 2001). With his provocative, 
conflict-oriented political style, Koizumi rapidly attracted massive media attention. From the 
beginning of his political career, he often appeared in traditional mass media, such as the national 
newspapers and hard news on TV. However, when his popularity increased, he extended his 
coverage by participating in soft news, TV gossip shows  and talk shows. Koizumi’s interest in 
sports also made him an interview object of sports magazines. 
At that time, Koizumi belonged to the Fukuda group, a faction that became antagonistic to the 
clientelistic politics that the mainstream LDP represented. Hence, he did not enjoy any particular 
benefit from the LDP’s institutionalized factional system. To overcome his isolation within the 
LDP, Koizumi had a strong incentive to promote political reforms and use the media to gain 
external consensus. “Koizumi managed to capture the imagination of the Japanese public by means 
of snappy slogans and dramatizing politics. What set Koizumi apart from most former LDP leaders 
was that he appealed directly to [the] public” (Köllner 2006, p. 251). He presented himself as the 
spokesman of the people in a struggle with the Japanese elite, and he promised the end of 
preferential treatments for the groups and industries that until then sponsored the party factions 
                                                   
9The relationships among politicians, bureaucrats, and private companies are sometimes described as an “iron triangle” 
(Sakakibara 2003). 
10During the period, the rival party had been the Social Democratic Party of Japan, which is supported mainly by labor 
unions. However, the Social Democratic Party had never come to power until the 1990s. 
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(Lindgren 2012). In his political message, Koizumi insisted on the need to destroy the unhealthy 
relationships among politicians, bureaucrats, and entities with vested interests as the main challenge 
to rescue the Japanese economy. For this purpose, he repeatedly declared being ready to restrain his 
own party and its factions, as well as the industries that so far provided political support to the LDP.  
As part of this strategy, he proposed an intensive program of neoliberal reforms, including 
deregulation of industries (especially the “protected” ones), reduction of government size and 
public spending, privatization of public corporations, and introduction of corporate models of 
management in public welfare institutions. These measures not only had the objective of 
revitalizing the Japanese economy; during his term as PM, his political message also aimed to 
disconnect the ties among politicians, bureaucrats, and protected industries—to let prices, profits, 
and employment levels be governed by market forces, instead of being the result of a bargaining 
process between the political establishment and business organizations. The LDP supporters were 
roughly divided into those who would benefit from the reforms and those who would be hurt by 
them. “Koizumi came to power via a revolt by the LDP’s grassroots urban machine against the 
more rural-oriented party leadership” (Katz 2001, p. 38). He “demonstrated an uncanny ability to 
instrumentalize the media, both old and new. Electoral cooperation with the new Komei party 
progressed quite smoothly under Koizumi, contributing to the parliamentary dominance of the 
LDP” (Köllner 2006, p. 254). 
In 2005, the privatization of the postal service (considered as Koizumi’s principal policy) was 
strongly contradicted, not only by members of the opposition party, but also by many LDP 
members. Inevitably, the bill to privatize the postal service was rejected in the House of Councilors 
in August 2005. The rebellion of his own party members essentially prevented Koizumi’s primary 
policy from being realized. In response, Koizumi dissolved the House of Representatives (Shugi-in) 
and called for a general election to seek the public’s opinion on the bill. The privatization of the 
postal service thus became a key issue of the electoral campaign. In other words, Koizumi framed 
the election as a referendum on the privatization of the postal service.  
The Shugi-in has 480 members who are elected for a four-year term. Among them, 300 members 
are elected in single-seat constituencies and 180 members by proportional representation in 11 
districts. In each constituency, only one candidate can be elected. To avoid internal conflicts, each 
party usually nominates a lone candidate for a constituency. However, in the 2005 election, 
Koizumi broke this rule and recruited so-called “assassin” candidates to stand against the LDP 
members (representing some constituencies) who did not endorse the bill of postal privatization. By 
this means, Koizumi brought further drama to the vote. During the campaign, he made massive use 
of the mass media, especially TV, to describe himself as the hero of the reform and his opponents 
within the LDP as “resistance forces” that were “stuck in the past” (Köllner 2006). He clearly 
turned the electoral competition into a spectacular showdown between himself and his rivals. 
Overall, the electoral campaign was transformed into a sort of TV game show, encouraging voters 
to enjoy politics as they did sports or movies (Ohtake 2003). Consequently, the TV audience 
remarkably increased, leading TV broadcasts to treat the campaign as a form of political 
entertainment.  
On one occasion, Koizumi danced in his office with the American actor Richard Gere (who has 
been said to resemble him) (Van Gelder 2005). Political analysts argued that since this event was 
widely broadcasted on TV, Gere’s Japanese fans would then like Koizumi, even if they were 
indifferent to politics. The New York Times also reported an impressing episode in the US, 
emblematically illustrating the PM’s colorful political style. In 2006, Koizumi visited Elvis 
Presley’s mansion with the then President George W. Bush. Koizumi shares the same birthday 
(January 8) as that of Elvis; their similar hairstyles have also been noted. Koizumi rendered an Elvis 
Presley impersonation during his tour of the singer’s home. When Elvis’ former wife pointed out a 
pair of oversized, gold-rimmed sunglasses once worn by the King of Rock and Roll, the PM eagerly 
donned them, thrusting his hips and arms forward in imitation of a classic Elvis move. He later 
threw his arm around Elvis’ daughter, belting out some Elvis lyrics, “hold me close, hold me tight” 
  6 
(Stolberg and Dewan 2006). 
Koizumi’s strategy apparently managed to catch the attention of those who were usually 
uninterested in politics. It enhanced the common people’s involvement in the political debate; as a 
result, undecided and less informed voters massively turned to the LDP in the election (Köllner 
2006). Mass media played a fundamental role in inducing undecided or unaffiliated urban voters to 
support Koizumi’s principal policy. Where the influence of special interest groups and factions 
declined, “the personalization of the role [of the PM] is increasingly important to voters … Skillful 
and attractive prime ministers will gain popularity and better results for their party; unskillful and 
unattractive ones will find their terms quite short” (Krauss 2002, p. 12). 
In Japan, newspapers can be roughly divided into two categories. The national newspapers (such 
as Asahi, Yomiuri, and Mainichi) are distributed throughout Japan, and minor local newspapers also 
abound. Generally, the readers of the former are far greater in number than those of the latter. For 
instance, in 2010, the circulation of Yomiuri was 10 million, and that of Asahi was 7.9 million. To 
put it in context, compare it with the circulation of the Wall Street Journal and USA Today in the US 
at 2.0 million and 1.8 million, respectively.11 These differences in numbers show the newspapers’ 
wide circulation in Japan, compared with those of other developed countries. In 2005, 99.3% of 
Japanese households had TV sets.12 Therefore, considering the combined newspaper readership and 
TV viewership during the Koizumi period, the Japanese people were likely highly exposed to both 
media forms.  
 
2.3. Empirical Hypotheses  
Gentzkow (2006) described the introduction of TV in the 1950s as a dramatic improvement of 
previous entertainment technologies. Accordingly, the price of political information decreased, with 
an even greater reduction in entertainment cost. Consumers massively responded by moving away 
from political news toward new forms of entertainment. However, Koizumi’s ability to dramatize 
politics allowed TV broadcasts to incorporate political news into entertainment programs. Political 
news and entertainment began to be broadcasted in the same programs. According to Dyck and 
colleagues (2013), “By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to 
inform passive voters about regulation and other public policy issues, acting as a [partial] 
counterbalance to small but well-organized groups” (p. 521).  
However, mass media also draw citizens’ attention to the personal characteristics of political 
leaders rather than to policy issues. This process reduces the role and visibility of special interest 
groups, as well as the importance of habatsu. A similar example can be observed in the relationship 
between a movie and its leading actor. Fans of the leading actor often watch the film just because 
they want to see their idol on screen, even if they are not interested in the movie itself. This pattern 
also holds true for prominent actors competing in elections, as in Ronald Reagan’s case in American 
politics. To test Dyck and colleagues’ (2013) argument about the role of mass media in shifting 
public opinion’s attention from specific policy issues to the detriment of special interest groups, it is 
essential to empirically disentangle Koizumi’s popularity from that of his policy proposals that 
raised the opposition of special interest groups. Therefore, we propose the following two 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: As mass media contribute to spreading detailed information about policy issues, 
exposure to mass media may lead voters to support specific policies. 
 
                                                   
11 Even though since the late 1990s, the circulation of Yomiuri has been growing, while that of local newspapers 
declined (George and Waldfogel 2006), at of the beginning of 2010, the circulation of the New York Times was about 0.9 
million. . The data source of circulation in 2010 is “Circulation Data For National Newspapers”, which is available on 
the website of The International Federation of Audit Bureau of Circulations (IFABC): 
12 The data source is “Consumer Confidence Survey”, which is available on the website of the Cabinet Office, 
Government of Japan: 
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/stat/shouhi/shouhi.html (Accessed on May 7, 2014). 
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Hypothesis 2: As mass media highlight the appealing personal attributes of charismatic leaders, 
exposure to mass media may lead voters to support a leader even if they are not interested in his or 
her principal policy. 
 
We argue that the case of Koizumi’s success is particularly appropriate to test hypotheses 1 and 2, 
due to the Japanese PM’s strikingly engaging characteristics and special interest groups’ fierce 
opposition to his platform.  
 
 
3. Estimated Model and Estimation Results  
 
3.1. Data  
The GLOPE survey was purposefully conducted throughout Japan after the 2005 election to 
systematically investigate voters’ political opinions at the end of the electoral campaign. The 
respondents were adults belonging to various generations. Sample points could be divided into 
cities (considered as urban areas) and towns or villages (considered as rural areas). Three thousand 
adults were invited to participate in the survey, with a stratified, two-stage random sampling. The 
data included detailed information on how the Koizumi administration and his principal policy 
(postal service privatization) were perceived, as well as the respondents’ home ownership, years of 
schooling, demographic characteristics (age and gender), and household income.13  
Information on the sample used in this research is reported in Table 2. The mean value of 
KOIZUMI (Koizumi supporter dummy) is 0.62, meaning that 62% of the people supported 
Koizumi’s government. This figure is consistent with the election results. The mean value of 
PRIVAT (postal privatization supporter dummy) is 0.42, suggesting that 42% of the people 
supported the privatization of Japan’s postal service. This 20% difference implies that one-third of 
Koizumi’s supporters were attracted by his appealing personality but did not favour his main policy. 
It seems possible that people voted for the LDP and its candidates even though they paid little 
attention to the issues debated during the electoral campaign. Figure 1(a) indicates no relation 
between the frequency of watching TV and the men’s support for the Koizumi administration. 
However, Figure 1(b) suggests that the more frequently the women watched TV, the more likely 
they would support Koizumi’s government. Neither Figure 2(a) nor Figure 2(b) reveals an 
association between the frequency of watching TV and the support for the privatization of postal 
service, regardless of the respondents’ gender. These results imply that TV programs may have 
contributed to increasing the number of women who supported Koizumi but not his principal policy 
(a central issue in the general election).  
On the other hand, the frequency of reading newspapers is only weakly related to the men’s 
support for Koizumi and not at all for his policy.14 Overall, the research results are consistent with 
hypothesis 2 but not with hypothesis 1. To further scrutinize these findings, regression estimations 
were conducted, and the results are discussed in section 4. 
 
3.2. Empirical Model  
To test hypotheses 1 and 2, the estimated function takes the following form: 
 
Yi = 0 + 1 TVi + 2 NEWS i + 3 Ln(INCOM) i + 4 Ln(EDU) i + 5 Ln(AGE) i + 5 SPOUS i + 
6 CHILD i + 7UNEMP i + 8 KNOW i + 9 GOVPT1 i + 10 GOVPT2 i + 11VILLAG i + 12MAN 
                                                   
13Data for this secondary analysis were sourced from the “Social and Political Consciousness Survey in 21st Century 
Japan (GLOPE 2005)”. Data were collated by the Waseda University Centre of Excellence Program for the 21st 
Century: Constructing Open Political-Economic Systems (21 COE-GLOPE). The research was subcontracted to Chuo 
Chosa-Sha. Data were provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social Science 
Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
14The figures may be requested from the corresponding author.  
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i + ui , 
 
where Yi represents the dependent variable for an individual i such as KOIZUMI and PRIVAT. The 
error term is represented by ui. Because KOIZUMI and PRIVAT are dummy variables that are either 
1 or 0, a probit model can be used. However, if a correlation exists between the residuals of 
different equations, then a bivariate probit model is more appropriate to conduct estimations of 
KOIZUMI and PRIVAT at the same time (Greene 2008). Furthermore, ’ is the marginal effect, as 
reported in Tables 3, 4, and 5.15  
The coefficients of TV and NEWS might be positive in columns (2), (4), and (6) of Tables 3-5, in 
case hypothesis 1 would be supported. On the other hand, the coefficients of TV and NEWS might 
be positive in columns (1), (3), and (5), in case hypothesis 2 would be supported. This approach 
would allow the comparison of the effects of the two forms of media. Our results suggest that 
newspapers could provide more detailed information about political issues than TV shows could. 
However, TV broadcasts of Koizumi’s performances were more vivid and visual than newspaper 
articles and more effective in attracting stronger consensus with his government, despite the 
audience’s lack of attention to the privatization policy announced during the electoral campaign. 
To control for the respondents’ socioeconomic conditions, the logs of household income level 
(INCOM), years of schooling (EDU), age (AGE), and work status (UNEMP) were included as 
independent variables. Generally, Koizumi’s economic agenda relied on free trade and market 
competition as drivers to improve economic efficiency. The privatization of the postal service was 
intended as the first step of a broader program aimed at reshaping the public sector. In principle, the 
expansion of the private sector might offer highly educated people greater opportunities for higher 
earnings. Therefore, EDU was predicted to be positive. In contrast, unemployed workers were less 
likely to benefit from the restructuring of the public sector, so the coefficient of UNEMP was 
expected to be negative. SPOUS (dummy for being married) and CHILD (dummy for having 
children) were incorporated to capture the family structure. KNOW (a dummy equal to 1 if the 
interviewee could identify the Speaker of the House of Representatives in Japan) was included to 
capture the degree of the respondents’ knowledge of Japan’s political situation. As mentioned, 
Koizumi’s government was supported by an alliance between the LDP and the new Komei party. 
The respondents’ political standpoints were captured by GOVPT1 (dummy for being an LDP 
                                                   
15In a similar methodological framework, Sabatini (2012) used an instrumental variables approach to control for 
endogeneity of trust in TV as a determinant of trust in former Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi. However, in the case 
addressed by Sabatini (2012), Berlusconi owned some major media outlets and actively controlled them, which created 
ambiguity about the interpretation of the relationship as a causal one. In fact, people who trusted Berlusconi might have 
a higher propensity to trust TV. In the Italian study, the key variable, trust in TV, is clearly endogenous due to the 
possibility of reverse causality. In the Japanese case discussed in the present paper, Koizumi never owned a media 
outlet, and there is a decent degree of pluralism in TV and newspaper ownership and contents. The Japan General 
Social Surveys (JGSS) have been conducted nationwide to collect individual-level data, more specifically, covering the 
2000–2010 period during and after the Koizumi government. Based on the JGSS data, the average time spent watching 
TV was around 3.5 hours, which did not differ between the period of the Koizumi government and other periods. The  
JGSS data also indicated that the habit of reading newspapers did not change before, during, and after Koizumi’s 
administration. These findings suggest that TV watching and newspaper reading remained stable, basically depending 
on lifestyles and other variables such as education (which are controlled for within the empirical analysis), rather than 
on Koizumi’s performance or his principal policy. Therefore, the assumption that the key variables are endogenous does 
not hold true in the present paper.  
Supplementary estimations are conducted to check this argument. For instrumental variables, Sabatini (2013) used 
proxies of social capital such as the quality of friendships and trust in the press. In the present study, we followed 
Sabatini’s (2013) method and conducted an instrumental variable (IV) probit estimation where TV and NEWS were 
treated as endogenous variables and instrumented with the degree of community participation (regarded as a proxy for 
social capital). The results of the Wald test for the exogeneity of TV (and NEWS) were obtained. The test statistics were 
insignificant; thus, there is insufficient evidence in the sample to reject the null hypothesis about the absence of 
endogeneity. This finding suggests that there is no need to use instrumental variables because the endogeneity bias does 
not exist. The results of the IV probit model are similar to those reported in Tables 3–5. They are omitted for the sake of 
brevity and may be requested from the corresponding author. 
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supporter) and GOVPT2 (dummy for being a supporter of the new Komei party). Reverse causality 
between KOIZUMI and GOVPT1 (and GOVPT2) was possible, resulting in estimation bias. 
However, the estimation results reported later did not change, even when GOVPT1 and GOVPT2 
were excluded from the set of independent variables. Traditionally, the LDP received support from 
rural voters; however, the influence of urban residents (traditionally independent voters) also 
increased. As mentioned in section 2, Koizumi enjoyed greater support from urban residents than 
from their rural counterparts. Hence, the coefficient of VILLAGE was anticipated to be negative. 
Furthermore, the perception that females would find Koizumi more appealing led to a negative 
forecast for MAN.  
 
4. Estimation Results  
 
Table 3 reports the estimation results based on the whole sample. Tables 4 and 5 present the 
results for men and women, respectively. Tables 3–5 used a bivariate probit model; thus, the 
determinants of KOIZUMI and PRIVAT were jointly estimated. The pairs of joint estimations are 
reported in columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4), and (5) and (6). The correlation coefficient for TV and 
NEWS is 0.42 and statistically significant. Hence, to deal with the possibility of such collinearity, 
we also report alternative models where either TV or NEWS is omitted from the set of independent 
variables. Therefore, two sets of results for KOIZUMI and PRIVAT are presented in columns (3) and 
(4) and columns (5) and (6).  
As expected, the coefficients of the key variables (TV and NEWS) are positive in columns (1), (3), 
and (5) of Table 3 when KOIZUMI is the dependent variable. TV is statistically significant in 
columns (1) and (3), and NEWS is statistically significant in column (5) but not in (1). Owing to the 
correlation between TV and NEWS, their standard errors increase in column (1), which might lead to 
insignificant values for NEWS. In contrast, the significance of TV does not change, suggesting 
robust results. Additionally, the size of the marginal effect of TV is larger than that of NEWS when 
KOIZUMI is the dependent variable. Overall, the effect of the frequency of watching TV on the 
support for Koizumi’s government is more significant than that of reading newspapers.  
Regarding the results of PRIVAT, contrary to predictions, TV is negative in columns (2) and (4) of 
Table 3. As predicted, NEWS is positive in columns (1) and (6). Neither TV nor NEWS is 
statistically significant. These findings suggest that exposure to mass media increases the voters’ 
support for Koizumi. In contrast, TV and NEWS do not influence the voters’ advocacy of Koizumi’s 
principal policy, despite this being a key issue in the 2005 electoral campaign. Hence, these results 
confirm hypothesis 2 but not hypothesis 1. 
Concerning the control variables presented in Table 3, INCOM is positive in all columns. 
Furthermore, INCOM is statistically significant in the estimation of KOIZUMI, but not in that of 
PRIVAT. Respondents with higher incomes apparently are more likely to support Koizumi. 
However, income level is not correlated with the support for the privatization of the postal service. 
As shown in columns (1), (3), and (5), the coefficient of EDU is negative but statistically 
insignificant in the estimation of KOIZUMI. As reported in columns (2), (4), and (6), EDU is 
positive and statistically significant in the estimation of PRIVAT. Education seems to have 
conflicting effects on the support for Koizumi and that for his privatization program. On one hand, 
more educated voters are likely to perceive the reshaping of the public sector as a source of 
opportunities for the private sector that may benefit highly skilled workers. On the other hand, 
higher levels of education seem to make voters less sensitive to the appeal of leaders’ personal 
characteristics.  
These results are generally consistent with Sabatini’s (2012) findings, which identified trust in TV 
as a strong predictor of trust in the Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi in 2011, thus suggesting his media 
empire’s key role in amplifying his appealing personal attributes, thereby fundamentally 
contributing to building political consensus. 
As reported in columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 3, the coefficient of AGE is statistically 
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significant and negative when the determinants of the support for Koizumi are estimated. These 
findings suggest that older people who share more traditional Japanese values are less influenced by 
Koizumi’s performances, probably preferring more conventional ways to develop the political 
debate. With respect to family structure (SPOUS and CHILD), work status (UNEMP), and 
knowledge of politics (KNOW), their coefficients do not show statistical significance in any 
column. One possible explanation for these results is that the effects of work status and political 
knowledge are absorbed by education or income. Consistent with the prediction, GOVPT1 is 
positive and statistically significant in all columns, suggesting the LDP supporters’ tendency to 
support both Koizumi and his political platform. The results of GOVPT2 are similar to those of 
GOVPT1 although statistically insignificant in columns (2), (4), and (6). These findings reflect that 
the followers of the new Komei party (allied with the LDP) are inclined to support Koizumi rather 
than his specific policy. VILLAGE is negative in all columns and shows statistical significance in 
columns (1), (3), and (5). These results corroborate the argument that Koizumi was widely 
supported by undecided voters, mainly urban residents, but not by rural voters who were more 
likely to belong to some special interest groups in the agricultural sector (Miyake 1989). 
Tables 4 and 5 show the gender differences in the results for the key variables. In Table 4, which 
only accounts for men’s responses, the coefficients of TV and NEWS are positive in all columns but 
statistically insignificant, with the exception of NEWS in column (5). Thus, the frequency of 
watching TV is not associated with men’s support for Koizumi’s government and policy. The 
frequency of reading newspapers also has a weak effect on men’s support. These results suggest the 
mass media’s lack of influence on men’s views about Koizumi.  
Table 5 reports the results of the estimation conducted on the subsample of women. The 
coefficient of TV is positive and statistically significant in columns (1) and (3) and is negative and 
insignificant in columns (2) and (4). Furthermore, the statistical insignificance of NEWS in all the 
columns implies that the frequency of watching TV leads women to prefer Koizumi but not his 
political agenda. In contrast, the frequency of reading newspapers has no impact on women’s 
advocacy for Koizumi’s government and policy. It is interesting to observe that VILLAGE is not 
statistically significant although it is negative, indicating no difference between rural and urban 
women in their support for Koizumi. This finding is in line with the argument that Koizumi enjoyed 
widespread popularity and support in both urban and rural regions (Ohtake 2003, pp. 128–129).  
Summarizing the results reported in Tables 3–5 leads to the conclusion that the combined 
estimation results proposed in this section are congruent with and reasonably support hypothesis 2, 
while hypothesis 1 is not validated. Moreover, the images provided by the media, specifically on 
TV, do not influence the support from men but (probably due to TV’s ability to highlight the PM’s 
appealing personal traits) stimulate significant backing from women. Undecided female voters are 
probably fascinated by Koizumi’s performance but not by his platform, as reported by mass media. 
This finding confirms the argument that the Japanese people were largely indifferent to politics, 
even immediately after the 2005 general election (Tsutui et al. 2010).  
As stated, Koizumi’s popularity is comparable to that of Ronald Reagan (Ohtake 2003, pp. 115–
127). Before becoming Governor of California, Reagan was mostly known for his performances as 
an actor. Our results suggest that Koizumi strategically offered appealing presentations to 
deliberately attract undecided female voters. Throughout his electoral campaign, Koizumi 
repeatedly and strongly promoted his political platform by using simple slogans such as “I aim for a 
small government,” “What can be done by the private sector should be done by the private sector,” 
and “I ask whether you agree with the privatization of the postal service” (Ohtake 2003, p. 123). 
Nonetheless, it was his engaging performance and not his perseverance in his primary policy that 
probably resulted in his landslide victory. Broadcasting Koizumi’s orchestrated political show 
substantially increased the viewing audience. Inevitably, the TV medium dealt with Koizumi’s 
electoral strategy of “political entertainment” (Ohtake 2003, pp.198–238). Any disadvantages 
Koizumi might have experienced by not belonging to the mainstream LDP were more than 
counterbalanced by his unique showmanship and masterful use of mass media. It could be argued 
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that through his experience as a politician, Koizumi naturally learned how effective and significant 
the superstar effect could be in an election. He exploited TV to purposefully play the dual roles of 
entertainer and innovator in the political world to overcome the opposition of the traditional 
political forces linked with special interest groups. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper was to analyze the role of mass media in the formation of people’s 
consensual support for charismatic political leaders, based on the hypothesis that the superstar 
effect reported by the literature in several markets may also hold true in the political sector. For this 
purpose, this study dealt with the case of Koizumi, Japan’s longest-serving PM over the past 25 
years. To test the hypotheses that media drew voters’ attention to Koizumi’s charming personal 
traits rather than to specific policy issues (allowing the PM to fully exploit the “superstar effect”), 
we empirically assessed whether exposure to TV and newspapers influenced voters’ political views.  
Based on a survey conducted immediately after Koizumi’s landslide electoral win in 2005, a 
bivariate probit model was used for the estimation. The major findings are as follows. First, results 
based on combined sample of men and women suggest that the frequencies of exposure to mass 
media is positively related to the support for Koizumi. On the other  hand, they are not significantly 
correlated with the most distinctive policy he proposed in the electoral campaign. Second, the effect 
of watching TV on the support for Koizumi is more significant than that of reading newspapers. 
Third, after dividing the sample into men and women, the impact of watching TV is only observed 
for females, whereas the influence of reading newspapers is only observed for males.  
In contrast to his opponents’ case, Koizumi was not supported by the LDP’s institutionalized 
factional system or by special interest groups. Thus, it was necessary for him to use the media to 
compete with his political rivals. From the observations gathered in this research, we derive the 
following implications.  
Populism has been defined by political theorists as “an appeal to the people against the 
established structure of power” (Canovan 1999, p. 3) and as “a style of political rhetoric that seeks 
to mobilize ordinary people against both the established structure of power and the dominant values 
in society” (Kazin 1995). Our results suggest that Koizumi used the medium of TV as a populist 
strategy to appeal directly to common people, overcoming the power structure of his own party and 
challenging the dominant views and practices of the Japanese political establishment. He repeatedly 
presented himself as the spokesperson of the masses in a struggle with the Japanese elite. From this 
point of view, Koizumi’s political experience notably resembles the rise and success of former 
Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi (Sabatini 2013).  
Koizumi’s televised performances played a greater role than his principal policy in drawing 
electoral support from voters of the opposite sex. This case suggests that TV is a powerful amplifier 
of political leaders’ appealing personal attributes, which may serve a fundamental function in 
electoral competitions. Our results also seem consistent with the argument that the mix of political 
news and TV entertainment encourages passive voters to exercise this right. This situation may help 
outsider candidates to counterbalance the influence of special interest groups (Dyck et al. 2013).  
On the other hand, the impact of newspapers is less significant than that of TV. Newspapers can 
provide detailed information about policy issues, allowing citizens to support specific measures 
even when they are detrimental to special interest groups. However, exposure to newspapers per se 
does not seem to counteract the influence of special interest groups; for this purpose, Koizumi’s 
case teaches that the masterful use of TV is a key component of electoral success. Overall, a couple 
of lessons can be derived. The superstar effect is an important driver of consensus, which may 
allow celebrities to overcome the opposition of small, special interest groups. At the same time, 
particular attention should be paid to the danger of populism.  
Since the advent of mass media, many charismatic political leaders have effectively used these 
means of communication to increase voter support. Our results point to TV’s particular function in 
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boosting attractive leaders’ followers from the opposite sex. Further research is needed to determine 
whether this argument may be generalized. More specifically, this issue is worth examining by 
using data from other democracies.  The extent to which televised images of a female leader could 
influence male voters is also a relatively new area of study that merits further exploration. 
 In this regard, the question arises whether the effect is the same between the sexes. Moreover, 
this paper has only dealt with the impact of traditional mass media such as TV and newspapers, 
which do not allow for interactive communication. In modern society, the rising influence of 
various types of interactive media (such as Twitter and Facebook) on the political arena cannot be 
ignored (Antoci et al. 2012; Sabatini and Sarracino 2014).Research analyzing the Internet’s effects 
on political opinions is another fairly recent field that warrants in-depth studies. 
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Figure 2. Supporting privatization of postal service. 
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Table 1 
Duration of each government (from 1989 to 2012) 
Government  
Months 
 
Highest 
support rate 
(%) 
Lowest 
support rate 
(%) 
Uno  2 28 28 
Kaifu 27  56 35 
Miyazawa 21  54  20 
Hosokawa  8  71  57 
Hata  2  47  47 
Murayama 19  42  33 
Hashimoto 30  53 31 
Obuchi 21  49 23 
Mori 12  39   7 
Koizumi 60  85  39 
Abe (First government) 12  65  29 
Fukuda 12  58  20 
Aso 12 49 15 
Hatoyama  9  72  21 
Kan 15  65  16 
Noda 15  60  20 
Average 17.3   
Note: From Uno to Obuchi administrations, the data is collected from Hayamashi and Sakuraba (2002). 
After Mori administration, the data is gathered from annual investigation about political view cudnucated 
byd Nippon Hoso-kyokai.  
Source: http://www2.ttcn.ne.jp/honkawa/5236a.html (accessed on April 26, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Definition Mean 
KOIZUMI Value is 1 if respondent supports Koizumi, 0 otherwise. 0.62 
PRIVAT Value is 1 if respondent supports the privatization of postal 
services, otherwise 0. 
0.42 
 TV 
 
Frequency of watching TV. 
1 (not at all)–5 (every day) 
 4.75 
  NEWS 
 
Frequency of reading newspaper. 
1 (not at all)–5 (every day) 
 4.38 
INCOM Household income (million yen) 
 
  5.22 
EDU Years of schooling 
 
 12.5 
AGE 
 
Age  54.7 
 SPOUS Value is 1 if respondent has a spouse, otherwise 0. 
 
0.80 
CHILD 
 
Value is 1 if respondent has a child, otherwise 0. 
 
0.55 
UNEMP 
 
Value is 1 if respondent is unemployed, otherwise 0. 0.19 
KNOW 
 
Value is 1 if respondent knows that Yohei Kohno is the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives in 2005, otherwise 0. 
0.35 
GOVPT1 
 
Value is 1 if respondent supports the government party (the 
Liberal Democratic Party), otherwise 0. 
0.39 
GOVPT2 
 
Value is 1 if respondent supports the government party (the 
Komei Party), otherwise 0. 
0.03 
VILLAG 
 
Value is 1 if respondent lives in town/village, otherwise 0. 0.17 
MAN Value is 1 if man, 0 if woman. 
 
 0.53 
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Table 3 
Determinants of supporting the Koizumi regime and the postal reformation 
(Bivariate probit model): full sample 
  (1) 
KOIZUMI 
   (2) 
 PRIVAT 
 (3) 
KOIZUMI 
   (4) 
PRIVAT 
 (5) 
KOIZUMI 
   (6) 
PRIVAT 
 TV 
 
0.03* 
(1.70) 
−0.01 
(−0.23) 
0.04** 
(2.49) 
−0.002 
(−0.10) 
  
  NEWS 
 
0.01 
(1.45) 
0.01 
(0.40) 
  0.02** 
(2.29) 
0.004 
(0.31) 
Ln(INCOM) 0.07*** 
(2.67) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.07*** 
(2.78) 
0.002 
(0.09) 
0.06** 
(2.59) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
Ln( EDU) −0.04 
(−0.61) 
0.20** 
(2.41) 
−0.03 
(−0.49) 
0.20** 
(2.47) 
−0.03 
(−0.54) 
0.20** 
(2.44) 
Ln(AGE) 
 
−0.14** 
(−2.49) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
−0.13** 
(−2.34) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
−0.14** 
(−2.51) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
 SPOUS −0.01 
(−0.17) 
0.02 
(0.50) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.53) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.46) 
CHILD 
 
−0.03 
(−1.09) 
0.01 
(0.21) 
−0.03 
(−0.99) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
−0.03 
(−1.18) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
UNEMP 
 
0.05 
(1.20) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(1.24) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(1.07) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
KNOW 
 
−0.01 
(−0.29) 
−0.03 
(−1.01) 
−0.004 
(−0.14) 
−0.03 
(−0.97) 
−0.01 
(−0.31) 
−0.03 
(−0.98) 
GOVPT1 
 
0.44*** 
(19.9) 
0.17*** 
(5.19) 
0.44*** 
(19.7) 
0.17*** 
(5.20) 
0.44*** 
(20.1) 
0.17*** 
(5.15) 
GOVPT2 
 
0.24*** 
(3.29) 
0.07 
(0.79) 
0.25*** 
(3.37) 
0.07 
(0.81) 
0.25*** 
(3.34) 
0.07 
(0.79) 
VILLAG 
 
−0.10**
* 
(−2.68) 
−0.04 
(−0.95) 
−0.10*** 
(−2.67) 
−0.04 
(−0.93) 
−0.10*** 
(−2.67) 
−0.04 
(−0.93) 
MAN −0.04 
(−1.28) 
−0.01 
(−0.14) 
−0.04 
(−1.26) 
−0.003 
(−0.14) 
−0.04 
(−1.25) 
−0.004 
(−0.12) 
Wald chi-sq 208 
 
205 
 
202 
 
Sample size 
 
858 858 858 
Numbers without parentheses show marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics based on 
robust-standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. The constant 
is included but its result is not reported. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of support for Koizumi and the postal privatization 
(Bivariate probit model): sample of men 
 
 
Numbers without parentheses show marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics based on the 
robust-standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. The constant 
is included but its result is not reported. 
 
 
 
 
  (1) 
KOIZUMI 
   (2) 
 PRIVAT 
 (3) 
KOIZUMI 
   (4) 
PRIVAT 
 (5) 
KOIZUMI 
   (6) 
PRIVAT 
TV 
 
0.002 
(0.88) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(1.57) 
0.01 
(0.39) 
  
NEWS 
 
0.02 
(1.44) 
0.01 
(0.78) 
  0.03* 
(1.91) 
0.01 
(0.88) 
Ln(INCOM) 0.06* 
(1.73) 
0.04 
(1.00) 
0.06* 
(1.85) 
0.04 
(1.09) 
0.06* 
(1.71) 
0.04 
(1.00) 
Ln( EDU) −0.01 
(−0.05) 
0.22** 
(2.04) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.23** 
(2.09) 
−0.004 
(−0.05) 
0.22** 
(2.04) 
Ln(AGE) 
 
−0.11 
(−1.24) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
−0.10 
(−1.08) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
−0.11 
(−1.22) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
SPOUS −0.08 
(−1.34) 
0.03 
(0.53) 
−0.07 
(−1.15) 
0.04 
(0.64) 
−0.07 
(−1.18) 
0.03 
(0.54) 
CHILD 
 
−0.01 
(−0.34) 
0.01 
(0.39) 
−0.01 
(−0.29) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
−0.01 
(−0.36) 
0.01 
(0.39) 
UNEMP 
 
0.05 
(0.95) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(1.02) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.90) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
KNOW 
 
0.02 
(0.49) 
−0.08* 
(−1.83) 
0.02 
(0.62) 
−0.08* 
(−1.76) 
0.02 
(0.40) 
−0.08* 
(−1.85) 
GOVPT1 
 
0.41*** 
(13.7) 
0.19*** 
(4.25) 
0.41*** 
(13.6) 
0.18*** 
(4.21) 
0.41*** 
(13.7) 
0.19*** 
(4.25) 
GOVPT2 
 
0.37*** 
(2.89) 
0.13 
(1.08) 
0.37*** 
(2.94) 
0.14 
(1.11) 
0.37*** 
(2.87) 
0.13 
(1.07) 
VILLAG 
 
−0.12** 
(−2.59) 
−0.06 
(−1.05) 
−0.12** 
(−2.54) 
−0.05 
(−1.00) 
−0.12**
* 
(−2.62) 
−0.06 
(−1.05) 
Wald chi-sq 116 114 
 
115 
 
Sample size 
 
455 455 455 
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Table 5 
Determinants of support for Koizumi and the postal privatization 
(Bivariate probit model): sample of women 
  (1) 
KOIZUMI 
   (2) 
 PRIVAT 
 (3) 
KOIZUMI 
   (4) 
PRIVAT 
 (5) 
KOIZUM
I 
   (6) 
PRIVAT 
 TV 
 
0.04* 
(1.69) 
−0.01 
(−0.54) 
0.05** 
(2.16) 
−0.01 
(−0.68) 
  
  NEWS 
 
0.01 
(0.82) 
−0.004 
(−0.21) 
  0.02 
(1.51) 
−0.01 
(−0.46) 
Ln(INCOM) 0.09** 
(2.42) 
−0.04 
(−0.96) 
0.09** 
(2.47) 
−0.04 
(−0.97) 
0.09** 
(2.30) 
−0.04 
(−0.96) 
Ln( EDU) −0.10 
(−1.01) 
0.20 
(1.64) 
−0.09 
(−0.93) 
0.20 
(1.60) 
−0.09 
(−0.93) 
0.21* 
(1.68) 
Ln(AGE) 
 
−0.16** 
(−2.06) 
−0.04 
(−0.48) 
−0.15** 
(−2.04) 
−0.04 
(−0.49) 
−0.16** 
(−2.11) 
−0.04 
(−0.45) 
 SPOUS 0.03 
(0.68) 
0.02 
(0.39) 
0.04 
(0.78) 
0.02 
(0.36) 
0.03 
(0.72) 
0.02 
(0.37) 
CHILD 
 
−0.04 
(−1.03) 
−0.01 
(−0.28) 
−0.04 
(−0.95) 
−0.01 
(−0.31) 
−0.05 
(−1.16) 
−0.01 
(−0.19) 
UNEMP 
 
0.03 
(0.42) 
0.07 
(0.85) 
0.03 
(0.43) 
0.07 
(0.84) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.08 
(0.95) 
KNOW 
 
−0.07 
(−1.31) 
0.06 
(1.04) 
−0.06 
(−1.21) 
0.06 
(1.02) 
−0.06 
(−1.17) 
0.06 
(1.04) 
GOVPT1 
 
0.49*** 
(13.9) 
0.15*** 
(3.13) 
0.49*** 
(13.8) 
0.15*** 
(3.15) 
0.50*** 
(14.1) 
0.15*** 
(3.05) 
GOVPT2 
 
0.16* 
(1.87) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
0.17* 
(1.92) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.17* 
(1.91) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
VILLAG 
 
−0.07 
(−1.38) 
−0.01 
(−0.13) 
−0.07 
(−1.41) 
−0.01 
(−0.12) 
−0.07 
(−1.26) 
−0.01 
(−0.13) 
Wald chi-sq 117 114 
 
-466 
 
Sample size 
 
404 
 
404 
 
404 
 
Numbers without parentheses show marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics based on the 
robust-standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. The constant 
is included but its result is not reported. 
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